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The challenge of guaranteeing sustainable livelihoods in
small isolated Pacific island communities remains a
contested issue. Rising poverty within some of the Pacific
island countries gives urgency to considerations of
sustainable livelihoods. The increasing reliance on donor
support for provision of basic services in a number of the
Pacific island countries raises serious doubts on the
sustainability of the status quo. This paper assesses the
seriousness of the sustainability challenge and provides
avenues to addressing this challenge. Rapid population
growth with limited natural resources, renders subsistence
as a dwindling source of livelihood in many of the Pacific
island countries. Increased labour mobility for the region as
a whole, thus, has considerable merit.
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School of Economics and
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Labour mobility for sustainable
livelihoods in Pacific island states
Satish Chand
Pacific islanders need a source of sustainable
livelihoods. Subsistence agriculture has
historically served this purpose, but
population pressures on limited natural
resources makes this an unlikely candidate
for future security. Pockets of poverty have
emerged in nearly every island community;
in some the rate of increase in poverty is
alarming. Donors have been particularly
generous with aid to the Pacific island
countries as a group. Palau, despite being a
middle-income country, received the highest
amount of aid at US$1,753 per capita in 2001
(Table 1). Many others among the Pacific
island countries rank high amongst
developing countries in terms of aid receipts
on a per capita basis, partly because of their
(small) size as aid delivery is subject to
economies of scale. Donors can keep tiny
island communities with limited resources
afloat with aid, but this is contrary to the
concept of sustainable livelihoods. Charity
is neither sustainable nor desirable, and
continuing aid can create dependency.
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The rate of growth of income for the
Pacific island economies has, on the whole,
been weak. Over the 30 years to 2001,
annualised growth rate of per capita income
in constant local currency units has ranged
from 1.92 per cent for Kiribati to 1.4 per cent
for Fiji. The level of per capita income for
Vanuatu in 2004 was the same as that at
independence in 1980. Social problems are
rising in nearly every major urban centre in
the Pacific island countries; not surprising
given high rates of population growth with
stagnant income-earning opportunities.
High population growth and low incomes
are jointly determined, thus continuing
economic stagnation may provide little
respite from rising population. Given the
building pressure on the physical
environment, a return to sustainable
livelihood from subsistence alone is not an
option for several of the island economies.
New threats, particularly in the forms of
HIV/AIDS and changes in weather patterns,
may test the environmental and economic
resilience of small states.
The Pacific island countries, to improve
on their wellbeing, have to integrate more
deeply with the global economy. For the
smallest and remotest of the island
communities, access to industrial country
labour markets is perhaps the only viable
option. There is merit in broadening this
access, on a controlled and reciprocal basis,
for the region as a whole. A transient
population of workers rotating between the
remote regions and the metropolis will
induce demand for better governance within
the islands whilst cementing closer regional
ties (This issue is discussed later). The
benefits from such flows are likely to be the
largest for unskilled labour. Income-earning
opportunities for unskilled workers from the
islands has the potential to lower poverty at
home while at the same time raising worker
productivity through skills transfer.
Income earned from workers abroad is,
unlike aid, likely to provide a sustainable
source of revenue, and thus relieve the
resource constraints currently faced by
several of the Pacific island countries.
Remittances already constitute a significant
proportion of the economies of Cook Islands,
Fiji, Niue, Samoa and Tonga (Narsey 2004).
Easing conditions for (temporary) movement
of unskilled workers will give remittances
an even a greater role in the sustenance of
island economies (and remote communities)
of the Pacific. Such flows, if temporary, will
prevent depopulation of the smallest of the
communities. Reverse flows of retirees,
tourists and volunteers, moreover, will
generate employment opportunities within
remote communities. Allowing for reciprocal
arrangements on temporary flows between
developing and industrial country partners
will assist such a process whilst deepening
cultural, economic, and political ties across
the region. This is not to suggest a policy of
labour mobility carte blanche, but a strong
case exists for a well-managed program
allowing for a more fluid labour market for
the Pacific region as a whole.
Industrial country partners have much
to gain from deepening economic ties within
the broader region. International security
concerns have already increased Australian,
New Zealand, and US involvement in the
Pacific region. This follows recognition of the
potential for cross-border spillovers, such as
from a large-scale domestic conflict or from
an economic collapse in a neighbouring
state. Australian intervention in Nauru and
Papua New Guinea in 2004 and its
leadership of a regional intervention into
Solomon Islands were motivated principally
by security concerns. Donors have
historically taken an active interest in the
funding and provision of basic services into
those Pacific island countries lacking
capacity and resources to do this on their
own. The discussion in this article is
premised on the assumption that it is in the
4PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 3 2005 © Asia Pacific Press
donor’s interest to see the Pacific island
countries achieve sustainable livelihoods.
Denying Pacific islanders access to
labour markets in the surrounding
metropolis may threaten the very existence
of small far-flung island communities,
particularly as sovereign states. This in turn
will risk the survival of the culture of the
smallest of the communities and particularly
those facing threats of depopulation. There
is a great deal of literature showing that the
largest gains in global welfare would accrue
from freeing up movement of unskilled labour
(see Winters et al. 2003; Athukorala 2004);
the Pacific is no exception. Growing
shortages of labour within the neighbouring
industrial countries,1 moreover, will over time
increase economic incentives for out-
migration from the islands.
While population growth rates are
falling sharply in the surrounding rich
nations, Pacific island nations continue to
experience high rates of population increase.
The population of the island region as a
whole in 2001 was 7.8 million, more than
double the figure of 3.8 million in 1971.2 The
rate of population growth between the Pacific
island countries has differed significantly.
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Marshall
Islands have recorded annual growth rates
of 3.25 per cent, 2.89 per cent, and 2.79 per
cent, respectively. The populations of Tonga
and Samoa, in contrast, have increased at an
annual rate of 0.5 and 0.6 per cent,
respectively. The difference between these
two groups of countries is explained by out-
migration rather than differences in fertility
rates (Table 2). A large proportion of the
population is below the age of 15 years, thus
the high rate of population growth is likely
to last at least another generation. Some 45
per cent of the total population of Solomon
Islands, for example, is below 14 years of age
(Table 2).
Depopulation is the least of concerns for
countries such as Samoa and Tonga that
have historically experienced large outflows
of labour. This is because there already exist
large transnational communities. Samoans
and Tongans living in Auckland, Sydney
and Los Angeles who maintain regular
contact with their kin at home. These overseas
communities form the basis of regular trade
and commerce across national borders. Thus
neither Samoa nor Tonga face the prospect
of depopulation and/or loss of their cultural
identity. There is even a good prospect of
large reverse flows of retirees once the current
generation of migrants complete their
working life abroad. The link with their
homeland is strengthened by communally
owned land, to which many of the migrants
retain claim whilst living abroad.
Remittances are often exchanged for cultural
and communal obligations so as to sustain
links with family and the wider community,
not least to protect claims on communal
property.
Pacific states display considerable
heterogeneity in nearly every respect. For the
purposes of the discussion on sustainability
here, the major concerns include population
pressures in the smallest of the states at risk
of destroying the natural environment; rural
to urban migration within a context of limited
growth in employment opportunities thus
threatening social stability; and deteriorating
governance at all levels of society thus risking
the region becoming a collection of failed or
failing states posing a security risk to others.
Given resource endowments, the
sustainability of Pacific islands as a whole
need not be depressing, however. The region
has one of the most hospitable people of the
world, much of the marine environment
spanning large exclusive economic zones of
the individual Pacific island countries
remains pristine, and even population
density are low relative to the far more
prosperous island economies of Maldives,
LABOUR MOBILITY FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS IN PACIFIC ISLAND STATES
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Mauritius and Malta. Technological
developments—rapidly falling aviation,
shipping and telecommunications costs—
offer increased opportunities for isolated
peoples to improve on their livelihood via
trade with the rest of the world.
Sustainable livelihoods for Pacific island
countries will involve deeper integration
with the global economy. Regional labour
market integration will be a key component
in achieving this outcome.
Sustainability in individual
Pacific island countries
Pacific countries, in terms of economic
development and sustainability of
livelihoods, can be broadly categorised into
five groups. The first group comprises large
rich nations of Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand and the United States. These
countries are characterised by high levels of
per capita GDP, large populations relative to
the rest (New Zealand relative to Papua New
Guinea is slightly different in this regard),
Table 2 Demographic indicators, Pacific island countries
Fertility rate Life expectancy at Population ages 0–14 Urban population
(births per woman) birth(years) (per cent of total) (per cent of total)
Australia 1.75 79 20 91
Fiji 2.68 69 33 50
Cook Islands .. .. .. ..
French Polynesia 2.57 73 32 53
Kiribati 3.72 62 38 39
Marshall Islandsa 4.02 70 39 66
Federated States
of Micronesia 3.56 68 37 29
Naurua 3.29 62 38 ..
New Caledonia 2.54 73 29 78
New Zealand 2.01 78 22 86
Niue .. .. .. ..
Norfolk Islands .. .. 20 ..
Northern Mariana
Islandsa 1.33 76 20 53
Palaua 2.46 70 27 69
Papua New Guinea 4.36 57 40 18
Samoa 4.13 69 36 22
Solomon Islands 5.33 69 45 20
Tokelau .. 69 42 ..
Tonga 3.52 71 34 33
Tuvalu 3.02 68 31 ..
United States 2.12 78 21 77
Vanuatu 4.35 68 41 22
Notes: a Data for fertility rate, life expectancy, and population 0–14 years are for 2004, extracted from The
World Fact Book, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ accessed on 11 October 2004.
Source: Data is for 2001, and from World Bank Development Indicators, unless otherwise stated.
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and favourable social indicators of
development in comparison to the rest.
Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand and
the United States are the major donors to the
region (Chand 2004).
The next broad grouping comprises
French Polynesia and New Caledonia,
colonies of France, that share the features of
the first group but for the fact that the high
incomes and accompanying social indicators
of development are sustained via large net
transfers from France. Per capita aid to
French Polynesia and New Caledonia for
2001, for example, amounted to US$1,636
and US$1,359 (Table 2). It is, however,
arguable as to whether such high living
standards for the respective island
communities can be sustained without the
large transfers from France. Countries with
strong links with their former colonial
administrators such as those governed under
the Compact of Free Association with the
United States (this includes the Federated
States of Micronesia, Palau and Marshall
Islands) and in free association with New
Zealand (this includes Cook Islands, Niue
and Tokelau)3 have large transfers from their
rich country partner as well as access to their
labour markets. Under the arrangement of
being governed in free association with New
Zealand, the respective island states are fully
responsible for internal affairs while New
Zealand retains responsibility for external
affairs and defence. Such an arrangement
allows the inhabitants of Cook Islands, Niue
and Tokelau access to New Zealand
passports and thus to the New Zealand and
the Australian labour markets. Inhabitants
of the Federated States of Micronesia,
Marshall Islands and Palau carry their own
passports but are allowed to work and live
in the United States as ‘non-immigrants’.4
The abovementioned island states have had
privileged access to rich-country labour
market due to their historical links, and their
more favourable social indicators of
development is principally due to this
privilege.
The third grouping is made up the
Melanesian states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. These
countries have relatively large populations
but a large landmass; thus have low
population densities. The economic
performance of this group as a whole has
been poor, particularly over the recent past
as shown by low rates of growth of per capita
GDP over the 1999 to 2001 period (Table 1).
Life expectancy for this group as a whole is
low, and particularly so given rich natural
resource endowments. Papua New Guinea
provides an extreme case; being the largest
country within the Pacific island countries
with a population and land mass (and
potentially mineral, marine and timber
resources) greater than New Zealand but
with the lowest life expectancy of 57 years
(Table 2). Importantly for the discussion here,
none of the Melanesian countries have
special arrangements for access to the labour
markets of their former colonial powers. All
of the countries in this group face varying
degrees of social and political instability.
At the bottom of the ladder of economic
development lie the Micronesian states of
Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru (the last two are
not members of the World Bank, thus
economic information is scarce) that have
limited resources, high population growth
rates, and rising pressure on their limited
natural resources. Even though population
density within a few of the Pacific island
countries is high, on the whole the Pacific
island countries have low population
densities relative to economically successful
island economies such as Maldives, Malta
and Mauritius (Table 1). This is true even if
the limited amount of agricultural land
available in the respective island states is
taken into account. Malta, for example, has
minimal arable land and yet is able to sustain
in excess of 1,200 people per square
LABOUR MOBILITY FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS IN PACIFIC ISLAND STATES
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kilometre while Maldives at 934 is more than
three times the population density of
Marshall Islands, the most density populated
Pacific island country. What is clear for the
Pacific island countries is that population
densities have risen several-fold over the last
century, however.
The ability of the natural environment to
support subsistence living has diminished
over time and in some cases surpassed the
sustainable carrying capacity. Nearly every
Pacific island country faces poverty to some
degree. The capacity of the natural
environment to sustain subsistence living in
Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu may have even
declined as population pressures (and
mining in the case of Nauru) have led to
degradation of the natural environment. For
example, due to urban pollution, the fish
caught in Tarawa lagoon are no longer
considered fit for human consumption.
Populations in Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu
have reached a stage where subsistence
living for the current generation is not
feasible. These communities have little choice
but to open up to trade with the rest of the
world.
The annual supply-demand imbalance
in formal sector employment is alarming,
particularly for the Melanesian countries
that lack access to foreign labour markets.
The Solomon Islands’ formal sector
employment stood at 14,300 in 2000,
accounting for less than 15 per cent of the
total work-age population (Table 3).
Unemployment build-up will continue with
associated social problems unless some
14,700 new jobs are created each year. This
is not an easy task for an economy that is just
beginning to recover from a devastating civil
conflict. For many of the Pacific island
countries in economic strife, labour
migration over the immediate to short-term
is perhaps the only viable option for
sustainable livelihood. Urban populations
are likely to grow given that the bulk of the
population in the majority of the Pacific
island countries reside in rural areas and
draw their livelihoods from subsistence
farming. The proportion of the total
population dependent on the rural sector
(figures are for 2001) has been the highest for
Papua New Guinea (87 per cent), Solomon
Islands (84 per cent), and Vanuatu (79 per
cent). Rural to urban migration has been
rapid and at current rates, Tarawa’s
population will double to 73,400 by 2013
while those for Honiara and Port Vila will
reach 98,000 and 60,000, respectively, by
2016 (World Bank 2005). None of these cities
are built to carry such large populations; the
pressure this will put on the natural
environment could be extreme. The
challenges faced by Cook Islands and Niue,
in sharp contrast, is that of depopulation as
an increasing number of residents move to
New Zealand on a permanent basis.
A number of Pacific island governments
are facing budgetary problems that in turn
limit their ability to provide basic services.
Access to public goods, primary education
and basic health in particular, differs as
much between the individual countries as
across regions within Papua New Guinea,
the largest country. According to World Bank
data for 2001, the most recent available, some
24 per cent of Papua New Guinean youth in
the 15 to 24 age group and some 35 per cent
of those above 15 years were illiterate. This,
assuming a life expectancy of 60 years,
implies that nearly a quarter of the next
generation of workers, parents, and voters
will remain ill-equipped to take full
advantage of the opportunities offered by the
modern and global economy. The trends are
equally worrying for some of the Pacific
island countries. Life expectancies in Nauru
and Tuvalu have fallen over the decade to
1994.5
Subsistence affluence for the majority of
the Pacific islanders may be a distant and
rapidly fading memory. While population
8PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
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density at less that 15 per square kilometre
for the Pacific island countries as a whole is
low, the spatial distribution of population
across the individual Pacific island countries
is far from uniform. This holds true within
individual Pacific island countries. Even in
the Melanesian countries where population
densities are low, communal land tenure
arrangements have impeded long-term and
secure access to this resource. The contrast
between Fiji and Mauritius on this front is
most instructive. Fiji has nine times the land
area but a population that is only 70 per cent
to that of Mauritius; population density in
Mauritius, consequently, is 13 times that of
Fiji. Yet per capita income in Fiji is
approximately half that of Mauritius. The
land tenure arrangement is the key
distinguishing feature between the two
island nations. While in Mauritius all land
is held in individual title, some 90 per cent of
the land in Fiji is communally owned. The
uneven distribution of natural resources, and
land in particular, even in Melanesia has
wedged some of the communities into
positions untenable with subsistence living.
The many squatter settlements around the
urban fringe in the major capital cities are
testimony to the fact that long-term secure
access to land is a serious problem. Lack of
secure long-term access and individual title
rather than lack of land per se may thus be a
major hurdle to private investment in the
Pacific island countries.
Labour mobility
The Pacific island countries as a group face
the challenges of creating the conditions at
home that will then lead to investment and
job creation. The resource-rich members are
in a position to achieve such a goal.
Impediments to investments at home include
regulatory barriers, the high cost and limited
availability of land for long-term investment,
and the high cost of trade given small
domestic markets and being remote from the
Table 3 Annual supply-demand imbalance for formal sector employment
Total formal Formals sector share Fresh entrants into the
sector employmenta(‘000)  in work-age population (per cent) workforce per year (‘000)
Fiji 131.5 26.6 19.3
Federated States
of Micronesia 30.9 49.1 3.7
Kiribati 7.9 15.8 2.6
Marshall Islands 10.3 37.4 1.6
Palau n.a. n.a. 0.4
Samoa n.a. n.a. 5.0
Solomon Islands 34.2 14.6 14.7
Tonga 33.9 59.5 2.7
Vanuatu 14.3 14.4 5.6
Note: a data is for 2000 except for Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Tonga where the most recent data
available (1996) has been reported. Work-age population defined as those in the 15–64 year age cohort.
Data for column 3 are calculated assuming a uniform distribution of the population of under 14s.
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2001. Growth and Change in Asia and the Pacific: key indicators, Asian
Development Bank, Manila.
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major industrial country markets. For
example, in its 2004 survey on the business
environment for 145 countries, the World
Bank notes that to enforce a debt contract in
Papua New Guinea involves 22 procedures,
takes some 295 days to resolve and costs an
average of nearly 110 per cent of the value of
the debt. This compares with the average for
East Asia and the Pacific (corresponding
figures for the OECD in parenthesis) of 27
(19) procedures, 316 (229) days, and 54 (11)
per cent, respectively.6 In many cases,
resources for the necessary investments are
either unavailable or the returns from such
investments are insufficient to justify, on
commercial considerations, the requisite
investments. In some cases, social returns are
considerably higher than private returns, but
a lack of funds to the public sector has meant
that such investments have not taken place.
Labour mobility, thus, provides a way out of
the current malaise.
Permitting unskilled workers to have
access to industrial country markets on a
temporary basis offers a way out for island
nations trapped in a position of economic
stagnation. Six specific advantages arising
out of a scheme allowing for a rotating pool
of unskilled workers into industrial-country
markets are enumerated next. First, it enables
access to training including exposing the
workers to the disciplines of the formal sector
work in an advanced country. Reporting to
work on time, spending the whole day at the
work site, and observing the disciplines of
the workplace all constitute training for an
unskilled subsistence-sector worker from
Pacific island countries. Second, such
placement enables workers to earn financial
capital that in turn could be invested in
productive activity on returning home.
Workers often lack capital and exposure to
the opportunities offered by the market.
Third, the departure of a group of
unemployed people relieves pressure on the
physical and social environment at home.
Fourth, a rotating pool of workers from small
developing Pacific island states into large
industrial country counterparts exposes the
population to the operation of efficient
governments and a competitive private sector.
Such exposure will raise expectations of the
returnees of their governments and private
sector service providers, thus creating
demands for better governance at home. Fifth,
a rotating pool of workers from far-flung
communities will build regional cohesion
and promote cultural exchange at the level
of the general community. There is a strong
case for reverse flows, that is, from the rich
nations into the islands, to consolidate the
gains from such exchange. Last, the workers
contribute to output in the labour-receiving
country thus the earnings constitute a
sustainable source of income for the sending
country. The challenge is in the design of
such a scheme that maximises net benefits
from temporary movement of unskilled
workers.
Temporary worker schemes do entail
risks. Concerns have been raised with regard
to the loss of skilled and professional workers
to neighbouring industrial countries (‘brain
drain’). In the cases where the education and
training of the emigrants is supported
through public sector subsidies, ‘brain drain’
could constitute a transfer from the sending
country to the receiving country.7 This
problem is not an issue for unskilled labour,
however.
There is also a risk of depopulation of
some of the smaller Pacific island countries.
However, countries such as Niue and Cook
Islands have unlimited access to industrial
country labour markets but still have resident
populations despite years of out-migration.
Labour unions in receiving countries
have expressed concern about the depressing
effect on wages of a large influx of foreign
workers. This is less likely to be an issue
given the relative size of the Pacific island
countries, and even less so if the number of
10
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entrants is controlled and their impact on
domestic labour market conditions closely
monitored. Receiving countries have voiced
concern about risks of letting in criminals,
and new entrants to the labour market
accessing taxpayer-funded services. The last
two concerns can be addressed through an
efficient vetting process for applicants and
an effective tracking system for those allowed
into the country. Guest worker schemes in
Europe and North Americas demonstrates
that the risks identified above can be
contained.
Deepening labour markets can be
welfare enhancing for the region as a whole.
Martin, for example, notes that
properly managed guest-worker
schemes can contribute to economic
growth and development in sending
and receiving countries (Martin
2003:2).
There is already a large and growing
literature on the potentially large gains from
allowing temporary movement of natural
persons from developing to industrial
countries (Winters et al. 2003; Martin 2003).
The main difference in the case of the Pacific
islands is that the population of workers from
the region is small, and particularly so
relative to the size of the labour market in the
host nations. The challenge for policy is to
design a scheme that will maximise the
benefits of a temporary worker scheme. The
next section draws on the international
experience to how a temporary worker
scheme could be operationalised.
Movement of unskilled workers
Firms in host countries could be allowed to
subcontract work to Pacific islanders for a
fixed term not exceeding the legal ceiling.
These firms would be required to comply
with home country regulations and be liable
for violation of the entry conditions in
relation to the work visa. In the case of
German guest-worker scheme, for example,
a fixed quota of foreign workers without
family is allowed into the country for a
maximum of 2 years.8 The United States has
a similar scheme where unskilled workers
are allowed into the country under the H-2
visa programme. Pacific island countries
given access to industrial country labour
markets could be required to give similar
access to workers from the partner country.
The latter scheme would be attractive to
tourists on working holidays and to retirees
and volunteers wishing to work and travel
the region.
Incentives would have to be created to
induce workers to return home on the expiry
of their work visa. This could entail employers
being required to hold a mandated portion
(say 20 per cent) of after-tax wages of their
guest workers in a trust fund that can only
be accessed by the worker on returning home.
Visa conditions could specify the duration
of stay, the unique employee number (akin to
the Australian tax file number), an explicit
commitment by the applicant to return to the
country of origin on the expiry of the visa,
and the conditions of employment and
remuneration. Workers, for example, may be
required to save a fixed proportion of their
income in a fund that would be accessible
only on their return to their home country.
Such a fund, in addition to being an incentive
to return home, will act as a compulsory
savings device and a potential resource to
draw upon to enforce compliance should the
worker breach the conditions of their visa.
Any social security and tax contributions
could be added to the fund after the worker
has satisfied all of the visa conditions.
Since demand for places is likely to
exceed supply, country quotas would have
to be devised under a government-to-
government memorandum of understanding.
While the size of the country quota would
have to be negotiated, the broad principle
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would be to ensure equity across the
participating Pacific island countries while
maximising gains from such flows. The
availability of job opportunities at home and
the potential gain to the sending and
receiving countries would be the key
considerations here. The latter could be
inferred from the wage difference for
unskilled workers between the sending and
receiving country. The above conditions
would apply to trainees should the scheme
be expanded to include them as well.
The quota could be applied to the
number of workers from each Pacific island
country. The host nations could make a
commitment not to reduce the quota to provide
certainty of access from the sending
countries. The vetting process could require
workers to pass a security clearance. The
potential employer may be required to
provide cover for medical and accident
insurance, the costs of which may be
recovered from the wages of the prospective
employee. In addition to the above, a written
offer of employment would be required for
the issue of a visa. The Canadian seasonal-
worker program provides a model in this
regard. Germany’s guest-worker scheme
places responsibility for enforcement of visa
conditions—and the return of the temporary
worker to their home countries in
particular—on the local hiring company.
Coordination between prospective
employees located in distant communities
and employers in industrial nations will
require intermediaries to make the market.9
Such intermediation will require seeding and
some level of ongoing supervision. Labour-
importing nations such as Canada,
Germany, and the United States all have a
well-developed migration infrastructure for
temporary workers and one that should be
encouraged to expand its services into the
Pacific.10
To attract the best workers and induce
compliance with the stipulated regulations,
rules regarding access to foreign labour
markets for the unskilled workers would
need to be transparent and publicly
accessible. Cross-border networks including
community groups and non-government
organisations that have traditionally played
a major role in facilitating cross-border
movement of people could be given
government certification as intermediaries
between prospective workers and employers.
Such community groups are likely to be
helpful in assimilating entrants into the
workforce and in providing ongoing
support. Rewards in terms of access to
country quotas to such networks could be
made on the basis of past success in
recruitment (and returnees); this in turn will
lead to the development of a self-enforcing
and monitoring system with minimal
overheads for the taxpayer.
Immigration authorities have raised the
possibility of workers overstaying their visa,
a claim supported by the high rates of visitors
from the region who have overstayed.
Australian overstay rates as at June 1999, the
latest for which figures are available, shows
an average ‘non-return’ rate for all visitors
at 2.18 per cent; Tonga and Samoa had non-
return rates of 19.1 per cent and 14.2 per cent,
respectively (Table 4). Drawing inferences on
the overstay rates for temporary workers from
historical records on overstay rates for
visitors, however, is flawed for at least three
reasons. First, visitors who breach their visa
conditions often have this as their intention
when making their initial application.11
Moreover, many are compelled to take this
path as the only option to gaining access to
rich-country labour market. Second, those
who do breach conditions of their visa do so
at little personal cost since all of the costs of
enforcement of the visa conditions are borne
by the host nation. Third, a revolving door
for temporary workers provides the
incentives to return home on the expiry of
the work permit. Data on guest-worker
12
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schemes that have operated within the
European Union and the United States show
that ‘most migrants did rotate in and out of
labour-receiving countries as expected’
(Martin 2003:7). In the case of the 22-year US-
Mexico guest-worker scheme, apprehensions
for violation of visa conditions fell when
access was made easier. The Italian Interior
Minister is reported to have asserted that a
bilateral deal with Sri Lanka allowing for
1,000 young Sri Lankan migrants to enter
Italy for work and training  had stopped the
flow of illegal Sri Lankan immigrants (as
reported in Martin 2003:8).
Finally, any temporary worker scheme
would have to be consistent with
international treaties. Two that are most
pertinent include the World Trade
Organization (and GATS in particular) and
International Labour Organization
conventions relating to the rights of migrant
workers. The scheme proposed here deepens
regional trade, thus is consistent with the
broader principles of the World Trade
Organization. Allowing local labour
regulations to apply to migrant workers, thus
providing national treatment to such
workers, is also consistent with International
Labour Organization principles. The details
of any proposed agreement, however, would
need to conform with international treaties.
Conclusion
The Pacific island countries face the
challenge of ensuring sustainable livelihood
for their growing populations. Economic
performance in the majority of the Pacific
island countries has remained weak over the
past two decades, trapping the poor in a
difficult situation. Subsistence agriculture
that has sustained small remote island
communities is under increasing pressure
given the limited natural resources and
expanding populations. These pressures
have led to urban drift as migrants from rural
areas have moved to areas with public
services and employment prospects. Further,
job growth within the island has lagged the
number of entrants into the workforce. It
would be wrong to claim that the seriousness
Table 4 Non-return rate from Australian by country of citzenship, at 30 June 1999 (per
cent)
Non-return rate
Vietnam 24.3
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 21.6
Lebanon 20.7
Tonga 19.1
Turkey 15.1
Pakistan 15.0
Philippines 14.4
Samoa 14.2
Poland 13.9
People’s Republic of China 12.8
Source: Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), 1999.
Annual Report, 1998–99, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
Government of Australia, Canberra.
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of the poverty problems is uniform across the
individual Pacific island countries; what is
clear however is that those Pacific island
countries having access to industrial country
labour markets have done better in terms of
social indicators of development than those
without.12 It can be asserted that privileged
access to industrial countries, as a function
of historical and colonial links, leads to better
income and social indicators.
Given the growing problems in several
Pacific island countries that do not have
access to industrial country labour markets,
could the extension of such privilege by
Pacific-rim industrial countries be a means
of generating sustainable livelihoods in these
small remote communities? The analysis
presented here suggests this may indeed be
the case. Donors could keep small remote
communities such as Nauru afloat with aid;
they have been very generous to date with
aid to the Pacific islands relative to other
developing economies. But such support is
inimical to the very notion of sustainable
livelihood. Generosity over the indefinite
future cannot be assumed, such generosity
in any case is counter-productive as it creates
dependency. Relaxation of regulations
governing mobility of unskilled workers from
the Pacific island countries to neighbouring
industrial countries offers standard gains
from such trade with the bonus of inducing
demand for better governance at home. A well-
managed program to facilitate the rotation
of a given number of workers from the Pacific
island countries into the neighbouring
metropolis accompanied by reciprocal
movement of visitors on working holidays,
retirees, and volunteers is likely to offer
significant economic benefits whilst
deepening cultural ties across the wider
region. Allowing workers to circulate
between the island nations and the
surrounding metropolis benefits both
societies by making the market for unskilled
workers whilst creating a bridge between the
communities.
International experience with migrant
worker schemes offers several lessons on the
design of a temporary worker scheme for the
Pacific island countries. Some of the core
features of the design would be transparent
rules governing the scheme, such that costs
of compliance are minimised. An efficient
vetting process is a necessary prerequisite to
ensure that those who enter as temporary
workers do so at minimal cost to the host
economy. An equally efficient tracking
system is required to guarantee compliance
with regulations. Finally, individual
governments would need to build incentives
into any temporary workers scheme in order
to ensure, and reward, voluntary compliance
with the scheme.
Notes
1 Seasonal shortages of labour can be acute,
for example, for fruit and vegetable
harvesting.
2 Due to lack of data the 1971 population total
does not include populations of the Federated
States of Micronesia, Northern Marianas and
Palau while the 2001 total omits Nauru, Niue,
Tuvalu and Tokelau.
3 Tokelau was a self-administering territory of
New Zealand but is in the process of moving
towards being governed in free association
with New Zealand.
4 See Section 141 of The Compact of Free
Association. US citizens do not have similar
rights to the labour markets of the Compact
countries; Clause (b) of Section 142 of the
Compact states that ‘the Government of the
Marshall Islands or the Federated States of
Micronesia shall accord to citizens and
nationals of the United States treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to citizens
of other countries’. Section 311 of the
Compact states that ‘[t]he Government of
the United States has full authority and
responsibility for security and defence
matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia’.
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5 Males in Nauru as of 2004, for example, had
a life expectancy of 52.5 years (compared to
55 years in 1994), the lowest in the region,
and falling (Haberkorn 2004).
6 Data drawn from http://rru.worldbank.org/
DoingBusiness/ExploreEconomies/
BusinessClimateSnapshot.aspx?economyid=150
accessed on 5 November 2004.
7 Remittance flows would have to be factored
into such calculations.
8 The 1992 quota was 100,000 for the country
as a whole that was made up of industry level
quotas.
9 Amigos Labour Solutions, a United States-
based company specialising in recruiting
seasonal workers for the United States from
Mexico, is a model in this regard (see http://
www.amigos-inc.com/index1.htm). The
Canadian Foreign Agricultural Resource
Management Services (FARMS) is a user-fee
model that facilitates recruitment of
Caribbean and Mexican seasonal agricultural
workers (see http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca).
1 0 The United Kingdom, Switzerland, and
France all have had successful and long-
established seasonal workers schemes.
Though they offer several lessons for design
of any ‘user-pays temporary worker
scheme’, it is unlikely that private providers
from Europe will expand their services to the
Pacific.
1 1 That is, there is a selection bias in the data.
1 2 This observation is consistent with a detailed
household level study for Guatemala that
showing that remittances reduce both the
breadth and depth (severity) of poverty
(Adams 2004).
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